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Cases 
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967,969 -70 (Utah 1989) 
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Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
Rules 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
§78-2-2, § 78-2a-3. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court made a conclusion of law that a deed of trust was not a valid 
agreement because no consideration passed between Defendant Allen Olsen and his 
son, Steven Olsen. However, under the law, it is not necessary that the consideration 
pass directly from the obligee to the obligor. A benefit to a third person may be 
sufficient consideration for a promise. Did the trial court err when it ruled that the 
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deed of trust is not a valid agreement for failure of consideration? 
The trial court made a conclusion of law that a deed of trust was not a valid 
agreement because no promissory note evidenced the debt. However, under the 
equitable rules of estoppel, a promise is enforceable where a party acts 
inconsistently with a later claim, the other party reasonably acts based on the first 
party's act, and injury to the second party would result. Did the trial court err 
when it declined to apply the estoppel doctrine to the facts of this case? 
Standard of Review 
A summary judgment determination is reviewed for correctness, with no 
deference granted to the district court's legal conclusions. Wayment v. Clear 
Channel Borad., Inc., 2005 UT 25, % 15,116 P.3d 271 (Utah 2005). 
Plaintiffs, the Andersons, made the argument that the benefit of the contract 
was for Mr. Olsen's son in the January 11, 2006 hearing on motions for summary 
judgment. Hearing Tr. p. 27,11.18-21. The Andersons made the argument in the 
hearing on motions for summary judgment that Mr. Olsen should be estopped from 
asserting that the deed of trust was invalid for lack of an underlying note. Hearing 
Tr. p. 26,1.19 - p. 28,1. 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns a loan made by Plaintiffs Boyd and Marilyn Anderson 
to Steven Olsen, the son of Defendant Allen Olsen. Both parties moved for summary 
3 
judgment and on January 11, 2006, the trial court heard arguments. On March 22, 
2006 the court issued its order granting summary judgment to Defendant Allen 
Olsen and denying summary judgment to Plaintiffs the Andersons. 
In 1995 Allen Olsen and his son, Steven Olsen, entered into a real estate 
purchase contract under which Steven would purchase from Allen real estate used 
in Allen's insurance business. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit "B." The real estate purchase did not occur at that 
time. Hearing tr. p. 21. f 2 -p. 22, f 4. In 1998 Defendant's son, Steven Olsen, who 
was married to Plaintiffs' daughter, asked to borrow money from the Plaintiffs, the 
Andersons, in order to purchase his father's insurance business. Hearing Tr. p. 2, 
Memorandum Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, Undisputed Material 
Facts %% 1-3. The Andersons agreed to loan the money on the condition that Steve 
Olsen provide security for the loan. Hearing Tr. p. 22,11.1-8, Memorandum 
Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, Undisputed Material Facts %% 2,3. 
Steven Olsen asked his father, Plaintiff Allen Olsen, to sign a deed of trust to secure 
the loan. Memorandum Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, Undisputed 
Material Facts f 4. Plaintiff Allen Olsen signed the deed of trust listing as 
beneficiaries Plaintiffs, the Andersons, and listing as security for the loan Allen 
Olsen's real property. Id. Undisputed Material Facts f 5. 
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Using the deed of trust as collateral, Steven Olsen obtained the loan he had 
discussed with the Andersons in the amount of $151, 000.00. Id. Undisputed 
Material Facts f 7. The Andersons subsequently recorded the deed of trust. Id. 
Unbeknownst to the Andersons, before borrowing the money from the Olsens using 
the deed of trust as collateral, Steven Olson had told his father that Steven did not 
intend to purchase his father's insurance business. Id. at f 6. There never was any 
direct communication between Allen Olsen and the Andersons regarding the 
dispersement of the loan to Steven. Id. at f 8. A promissory note was drawn up 
evidencing the debt but was not signed by Allen Olsen. Id. f 5. Steven Olsen made 
payments on the loan until he defaulted in July of 2001. Id. at % 10. Steven 
discharged the obligation to the Andersons in bankruptcy and the Andersons, 
unable therefore to pursue Steven, now seek to foreclose on the deed of trust. Id. at 
tn. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
/. The trial court erred when it made a conclusion of law that the deed of trust was not a 
valid agreement because no consideration passed between Defendant Allen Olsen and 
his son, Steven Olsen, as there existed consideration running from the Andersons to Allen 
Olsen's son, Steven. 
The trial court concluded that the deed of trust is not a valid agreement due 
to failure of consideration. According to the court, Allen Olsen's pledge of collateral 
for the debt of Steven Olsen was given solely in exchange for his son's promise to 
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buy the insurance business. 
But the deed of trust executed by Allen Olsen was a promise to provide 
security to the Andersons for a loan the Andersons subsequently made to Allen 
Olsen's son, Steven. It is an agreement not between Allen Olsen and his son but 
between Allen Olsen and the Andersons. Consideration runs from the Andersons to 
the Olsen's son, Steven. It is not necessary that the consideration pass directly from 
the Andersons to Allen Olsen. 
Steven Olsen asked his in-laws, the Andersons, for a loan. The Andersons were 
willing to lend Steven the money if he provided some security. A deed of trust was therefore 
executed between Allen Olsen and his wife, now deceased, as trustors, and the Andersons as 
beneficiaries. Allen Olsen thereby promised the Andersons to guarantee payment of a loan 
if the Andersons made the loan to Allen Olsen's son, Steven. Making the loan to Steven was 
consideration for Allen Olsen's promise. Therefore the trial court erred when it 
concluded that the deed of trust was not a valid agreement for failure of 
consideration. 
II. The trial court committed error when it made a conclusion of law that the deed of 
trust was not valid for lack of a promissory note as the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
ought to apply to the facts of this case 
The trial court concluded that the deed of trust was not valid because Allen 
Olsen never signed a promissory note to evidence the debt under the deed. But here 
the elements of equitable estoppel are met. There is an act by one party inconsistent 
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with a claim later asserted, reasonable action by the other party taken on the basis of the 
first party's act, and injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate such act. 
Steven Olsen approached the Andersons for a loan. The Andersons agreed to lend 
Steven the money if he provided them with security. A deed of trust was therefore executed 
between Allen Olsen and his wife, now deceased, as trustors, and the Andersons as 
beneficiaries. Allen Olsen thereby promised the Andersons to guarantee payment of a loan 
if the Andersons made the loan to Allen Olsen's son, Steven. Steven Olsen provided the 
Andersons with the deed of trust and, they being satisfied with the security, reasonably 
relied on it and loaned Steven the money. Now Allen Olsen asserts that, even though he 
agreed to secure the loan to his son, and even though the Andersons, in reliance on that 
security, loaned Steven the money, the deed of trust is not valid. Steven Olsen has 
discharged his debts in bankruptcy, and the deed of trust is the only recourse the Andersons 
have to recover any of what they loaned Allen Olsen's son. Allen Olsen should therefore be 
estopped from asserting that the lack of a written promissory note renders his promise to 
guarantee the loan, the deed of trust, invalid. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court erred when it made a conclusion of law that the deed of trust was 
not a valid agreement because no consideration passed between Defendant Allen E. 
Olsen and his son, Steven G. Olsen, as there existed consideration running from the 
Andersons to Allen Olsen's son, Steven. 
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The trial court concluded that the deed of trust is not a valid agreement due to 
failure of consideration. Order, Conclusions of Law, % 3. According to the court, 
Allen Olsen's pledge of collateral for the debt of Steven Olsen was given solely in 
exchange for his son's promise to buy the insurance business. Id. Evidence 
supporting the court's ruling includes the real estate purchase agreement under 
which Steven Olsen would purchase real property used in the real estate business 
from Allen Olsen, and the fact that no note was signed by Allen Olsen. 
But the deed of trust executed by Allen Olsen is a promise to provide security 
to the Andersons for a loan the Andersons subsequently made to Allen Olsen's son, 
Steven. It is an agreement not between Allen Olsen and his son but between Allen 
Olsen and the Andersons. While consideration does not run from the Andersons to 
Allen Olsen, it does run from the Andersons to the Olsen's son, Steven. It is not 
necessary that the consideration pass directly from the Andersons to Allen Olsen. 
See, e.g., Knox v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 196 F.2d 112,118 (C.A.IO 1952)(saying, "It 
is not necessary that the consideration pass directly from the obligee to the obligor. 
It is sufficient if there be detriment or disadvantage to the obligee and an element of 
benefit or advantage to the obligor, or to a third person at his request"), see also 
Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P. 477, 479 (Utah 1897). 
Steven Olsen asked his in-laws, the Andersons, for a loan. Order, Findings of 
Fact, f f 2-3. The Andersons were willing to lend Steven the money if he provided some 
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security. Id. A deed of trust was therefore executed between Allen Olsen and his wife, now 
deceased, as trustors, and the Andersons as beneficiaries. Id. at f 3. Allen Olsen thereby 
promised the Andersons to guarantee payment of a loan if the Andersons made the loan to 
Allen Olsen's son, Steven. Making the loan to Steven was consideration for Allen Olsen's 
promise. Therefore the trial court erred when it concluded that the deed of trust was 
not a valid agreement for failure of consideration. 
POINT II 
The trial court committed error when it made a conclusion of law that the deed 
of trust was not valid for lack of a promissory note as the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel ought to apply to the facts of this case 
The trial court concluded that the deed of trust was not valid because Allen 
Olsen never signed a promissory note to evidence the debt under the deed. Order, 
Conclusions of Law, f 4. While the Andersons through their attorney asserted a 
theory of estoppel before the court, Hearing Tr. p. 26,1.19 - p. 28,1. 4, the court did not 
address in its order why it failed to apply the doctrine in this case. Equitable estoppel 
requires proof of three elements: (i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one 
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other 
party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure 
to act; and (Hi) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. CECO Corp. v. 
Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967,969 -70 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). 
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Here, Steven Olsen approached the Andersons for a loan. Order, Findings of Fact, 
f f 2-3. The Andersons agreed to lend Steven the money if he provided them with security. 
Id. A deed of trust was therefore executed between Allen Olsen and his wife, now deceased, 
as trustors, and the Andersons as beneficiaries. Id. at % 3. Allen Olsen thereby promised the 
Andersons to guarantee payment of a loan if the Andersons made the loan to Allen Olsen's 
son, Steven. Steven Olsen provided the Andersons with the deed of trust and, they being 
satisfied with the security, reasonably relied on it and loaned Steven the money. Now Allen 
Olsen asserts that, even though he agreed to secure the loan to his son, and even though the 
Andersons, in reliance on that security, loaned Steven the money, the deed of trust is not 
valid. Steven Olsen has discharged his debts in bankruptcy, id. at ^ f 11, and the deed of 
trust is the only recourse the Andersons have to recover any of what they loaned Allen 
Olsen's son. Allen Olsen should therefore be estopped from asserting that the lack of a 
written promissory note renders his promise to guarantee the loan, the deed of trust, 
invalid. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court's grant in favor of Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment and denial of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be 
reversed. Plaintiffs, the Andersons ask for an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal. 
DATED this _ 2 L ^ l d a y of September, 2006. 
Douglas L^Neeley (#6290) 
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